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I. Introduction 
The issue of quality choice due to the imposition of trade restrictions has received 
considerable attention both in the theoretical and the applied literature. In this paper we study 
the effect of quantity restrictions on endogenous quality choice. A vertical product 
differentiation model (Mona, 1993), with a foreign and domestic finn, is analyzed for the 
case of imposition of quantity restrictions such as Voluntary Export Restraints, or import 
quotas. The government first announces an import quota, or equivalently the foreign country 
chooses a VER, on the foreign firm. Then the firms simultaneously choose the quality of the 
goods they want to produce. Following which they compete in quantities in the domestic 
market. 
The results in the empirical literature have been on the side of quality increase due to 
the imposition of the restriction (Feenstra (1985), Boorstein and Feenstra (1991), and Smith 
and Venables (1991». The existing theoretical literature has focussed attention on perfect 
competition and monopoly. Quality upgrading is typically observed in these cases l . The 
issue of quality choice in an oligopolistic framework has been analysed by Das and 
Donnenfeld (DD) (1989) and Ries (1993). DD look at the strategic effect of quantity 
restraints on quality choice in an oligopoly setting where firms decide simultaneously on 
output and quality. They show that quantity restraints always increase the quality of the 
imported good of the foreign firm. The quality of the domestic good increases if the foreign 
firm produces the high quality good. Contrarily, if the foreign firm produces the low quality 
good domestic firm lowers its quality. Ries extends this result to the case of a multiproduct 
See Falvey (1979), Rodriguez (1979), Santoni and Van Cott (1980) Das and 
Donnenfeld (1987), Krishna (1987), Donnenfeld (1988). For a summary of results on perfc~ct 
competition and monopoly, and for a very good selective survey on export restraints with 
imperfect competition see Krishna (1990). 
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monopoly. In his case if the foreign firm produces a range of low quality goods then it lacks 
an incentive to increase its level of qualities. 
DD and Ries, however, do not explicitly take time into account. This simultaneity (in 
the choice of quality and output) removes the ability of the fmns to manipulate its rivals 
quantity by commiting to a level of quality. In our model firms are able to commit as they 
incur a sunk cost of improving quality. Quality is chosen in the first stage of the game, given 
the equilibrium output choices in the second stage2• This is in agreement with the choice of 
the appropriate long-run/short-run variables as defined in Krishna (1990). 
We show that the choice of quality by the foreign and domestic firm after the 
imposition of quantity restrictions depends not only on which of the two firms produces the 
low. or high, quality good. It also depends on how binding the restrictions on the foreign 
firm are. A low, or high, quality foreign firm always downgrades its quality in response to 
the import restriction. When the domestic firm is low quality it downgrades (its quality) for 
restrictions close enough to the free trade level and upgrades for a sufficiently binding 
quantity restriction. However, if the home firm is of high quality then it always downgrades 
for any level of import restriction. For very restrictive quotas the average quality of the mix 
of outputs increases if the foreign firm produces the low quality only. If quality is a sunk cost 
firms have an incentive to lower qualities in the presence of quantity restraints. Thus, the 
imposition of quantity restrictions facilitates collusion between the firms. This result is 
similar in flavor to that of Krishna (1989) and Harris (1985). 
The paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in Section-II with the 
derivation of the benchmark results of Motta (1993). In Section-ITI we look at the effect of 
2Rietzes (1992) uses a similar approach to analyse the effects of tariffs on quality 
choice . 
.~._-_._-_._-----------------------,---------------
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quantity restrictions. In Section-IV we have the welfare analysis and Section-V is the 
conclusion. 
11. The Model. 
As in Motta (1993) we consider the simple case of 2 countries, foreign and domestic. 
There are two fIrms, one in each country producing a vertically differentiated good. The 
marginal cost of production is zero for both fIrms and does not depend on the choice of 
quality (s). High quality is indexed as SI and low quality is indexed as S2' such that SI>S2 
always. We concentrate on the effects of the quantity restriction in the domestic market only. 
There is a continuum of consumers in the domestic market, each is identifIed by its taste 
parameter a which is uniformly distributed over the intervaIIO,E>j with density one. Each 
consumer has unit demand for the good and the utility function, 
as - p if it buys a unit of the good of quality s. 
U= (1) 
o otherwise. 
Quality is costly and the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of quality is 
increasing in s and is given by (i12). 
The game proceeds as follows. At time '0' the government announces its decision to 
impose the quantity restriction on the foreign country. The government may impose an 
import quota, or alternatively the foreign country may choose a VER. We limit the role of 
the government to the announcement of the quantity restriction only. It is assumed that the 
government credibly precommits to a level of quantity restraint. After the government 
announces the quantity restriction the fIrms, fIrst, simultaneously choose their qualities. At 
the stage of quality selection each fIrm bears the cost i12. Finally, f11111S simultaneously 
choose quantities. We solve the game using sub-game perfectness. 
The demand for the low and high quality good is fIrst derived. Setting SI>S2' the 
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consumer indifferent between buying the high, or low, quality good has the taste parameter 
812 =[(pj-pJl(srsJ). The consumer indifferent between buying the low quality good and not 
buying at all has the taste parameter 802 =P/S2' The utility of this consumer is zero if it 
purchases good S2' Now, all the consumers for whom 0~~12 purchase good with quality 
Sj' All consumers for whom 812>9~02 will purchase quality S2' Those described by 902 >9 
do not buy the good. 
The demands for the high and low quality good are given by, 
Dj(pj,pJ = 0 - (PrpJI(sj-sJ (2) 
D2(pj,pJ = [(Pj-pJI(srsJ)-(P/sJ. (3) 
Solving for the inverse demands, 
Pj(x],xJ = 0SrS~j-Sr2 (4) 
plx],xJ = 0S2-SrrSr2 = [0-xr xJ S2' (5) 
Note, thatp/sj >P/S2 always, that is, there exists a 'discount' for the low quality. The cross 
derivative of the inverse demand with respect to own quality and own quantity is negative. 
This is the condition under which Krishna (1987) gets quality upgrading for the case of a 
foreign monopoly. 
To analyze the effects of quantity restrictions we first study quality choice in an 
unrestricted market (following Motta, 1993). The equilibrium outcome under free trade in 
quantities and qualities is thus obtained. This is then compared against the outcomes observed 
after the quantity restrictions are imposed. 
For any given pair of qualities (Sj,sJ firm i maximizes its profits, p;fxj,x)xj, over the 
choice of quantities Xi given the quantity of its rival Xj' This gives us the first order 
conditions (f.o.c), 
(6) 
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Solving for x/ and x2- we get, 
x/ (sJ,s;)=0(2sJ-s;)1(4sr s;) = 0 [1 - (2s/(4sJ-s;)], and (7) 
x2- (sJ's;)= 0 s/(4s1-S2). (8) 
(Note that, (dxt/dsJ>O, (dxj*/ds)<O, i,j=I,2.) From the foes we havepi-=s~i*' Thus, the 
net profits for a given pair of qualities are as follows. 
(9) 
strategic complement for the high quality. As firm 2 I S quality increases, fam l's marginal 
profit from increasing its quality increases. This gives firm-l an incentive to increase its 
quality and differentiate its product from that of its rival. On the other hand tf1C2-/ds~sJ=[-
202sJsl8sJ +s;)/(4sJ - S;)4] <0, that is, the high quality is a strategic substitute for the low 
quality. As firm l' s quality increases, firm 2' s marginal benefit from increasing its quality 
decreases. 
In the first stage firm-i chooses its quality Si to maximize its profits given in (9) 
given, the quality of its rival Sj' The focs then are as follows, 
0 2 (2 srs;) (8 s/-2 sJs2+s/)/(4 srs;)3=sJ (10) 
0 2 s/ (4 sJ+s;)/(4 srs;)3=S2 (11) 
Solving for the equilibrium quality levels we get, s*J= 0.2519 0 2 and, s*2= 0.0902 
0 2• Dividing, the relative equilibrium qualities are obtained, (s*/s*;)=2.79243. This gives 
us the equilibrium expression for X/(S/,S2-) =0.45080, X/(S/,S2-) =0.27460, and the relative 
equals 0.190702 under free trade. 
Ill. The effect of Quantity restrictions: 
We first consider the case (-1) where the quantity restriction (QH) is imposed on the 
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foreign firm producing the high quality good and the domestic firm the low quality good. 
The second case (-2) where the quantity restriction (QL) is imposed on the foreign firm 
producing the low quality good is then considered. The restriction imposed on the foreign 
firm, an import quota or a VER, is such that the foreign firm cannot sell more than the 
amount of the restriction. 
Case-!: Foreign Firm Produces High Quality Good. 
Let the quantity restriction, QH' be such that 0.25223505:QH5: x/(S/.S2-) =0.45080. 3 
Then the foreign firm chooses xlH = min. [QH" (112)(0- (s/sl)XJ. Assuming for the moment that 
the restriction is binding, that is, the foreign firm always produces at the level of the quota. 
We then show that this is also true in equilibrium. Thus, writingxlH-=QH' xm-= (112) (0-QH) 
(from (6» and solving for the prices we get, PlH-= (1I2)(2sr s:J(0-QH)' Pm-= (112) (0-QH)S2' 
and the net profits, 1t1H-(Sl,S:J=(QH/2)(2s]-s:J(0-QH)-(s//2), 1tm-(s].s:J=(1I4) (0 - QH)2 S2-
(s//2). 
Taking the first order conditions, 
(d1t lH/ds]) = QH (0 -QH)- s] = 0 => S] H-= QH (0 - QH') (12) 
(d1t2H/ds:J = (114) (0 - QH)2 - S2 = 0 => S2H -= (114) (0 - QHi (13) 
in the no leapfrogging region. Now, for a quantity restriction at the free trade level 
(QH=0.4508 0) the low quality domestic firm selects a quality level of 0.0754 0 2 
«s2-=0.09022 0 2) producing an output of 0.27470. The foreign firm chooses a quality 
3 We restrict attention to quantity restrictions such that neither of the frrms has an 
incentive to 'leapfrog' its rival. That is, the condition that a high (low) quality firm would 
not choose to produce the low (high) quality good is always satisfied. The proofs are 
available to the interested reader. 
In a related paper (Herguera et. aI, 1995) we analyse the implications on quality 
choice of very restrictive import quotas (VER's). 
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level of O. 24758 Ei « S/ =0. 251942 0 2) producing an amount equal to the quantity restriction 
imposed upon it. It can be seen from figure-l that the quality choice of both the firms, for 
restrictions close enough to free trade level, is always below their choice, (Sl·'S/), under free 
trade. Also, note that SlH· (=O.1886E>2»s2H· (=0.139790~ for the smallest quota 
(=0.2522350) at which there are no incentives to leapfrog. It is also seen that for 
sufficiently restrictive quotas (to the left of point A) the domestic firm produces a higher level 
of quality than under free trade. 
<figure-l here> 
The effect on quality choice of a restriction at the free trade level can be explained 
by looking at the effect on the reaction function of the foreign firm (figure-2). Producing a 
higher level of quality is costly for both firms. The quantity restriction on the foreign firm 
decreases the competitive pressure on the domestic firm given the qualities. Thus the 
domestic firm is unilaterally able to decrease its quality (which moves RI(X2) outwards to 
RI '(x2» maintaining its market share. It can thus increase its net profits, given that costs are 
quadratic and revenues are linear in its own quality. Meanwhile, the foreign firm can also 
lower its quality (moving RI '(X2) inwards), without losing its market share, and increase its 
profit at the lower level of quality (saving on the cost of quality). Thus, we get quality 
downgrading from both, the foreign and the domestic firms. A similar argument applies for 
quantity restrictions close enough to the free trade level. 
<figure-2 here> 
In the region where there is no leapfrogging average quality under the restriction is 
always lower than under free trade. The average quality for the quota at the free trade level 
(0.182403 0 2) is less than the average under free trade (0.190723 0 2). Further, given that 
average quality (s,w) equals, QH(02-20QH+9QH2)(0-QH)(1I4(0+QH))' it can be checked that 
""-----------,-----,-------------------------------
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it decreases as the quota becomes more restrictive.4 
The above results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition-I.' For a level of restriction at, or close enough, to the free trade level 
both finns downgrade qualities. As the quantity restraint becomes more restrictive average 
quality in the market decreases. 
Case 2: Foreign Firm Produces Low Quality Good. 
Let the restriction QLSX/"(S2-) =0.2746 0 be imposed on the low quality foreign firm 
(firm-2)S. Then the foreign firm choosesx2L =min.fQv , (1/2) (0-x])). Again. we assume first 
that the quota is binding on the foreign firm and then we show that this is also true in 
equilibrium. Hence, x2L-=Qv XJL-= (l/2)[0-(s/s])QJ, and solving for the respective prices 
we get, PJL-=(1I2)(0sr QL s~ andp2L-=(s/2)[0-QL(2-s/s])). The net profit functions are, 
Te JL-= (114s])(0s]-QLS~2_(S//2) and Te2L-=(S2QL/2)[0-QL(2-(s/SI)))-(s//2). Let, ')..=s/s]' then 
the first order conditions give us the following expressions, 
(14) 
(15) 
Dividing, (14) and (15) we get, 
4[(0/2)-QJQL +')..Q/)/(02-Ql ')..2)=').. ~()..3 +4').. - 4) Ql+2 0 QL- ').. 0 2 = O. (16) 
Solving for QL we get, 
(17) 
From (16), ')..=0 for QL=0 and ')..=0.359523 for QL =0.27460. Note, that').. increases with 
QL. because dQ/cD.> 0 for all QLSO.27460 (for all ')..sO.359523). Thus, from (15) we know 
Taking the first derivative with respect to QH we get, d(sAv)/dQH= -
(1I2(0+QHi)[(203-1102QH+80 QH2+9QH3)) >0. Note, that the term in brackets is negative 
for all relevant QH' 
5Firms are indexed by qualities. 
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that sJ increases when QL becomes more restrictive. Further, substituting (17) into (14) it can 
be checked that S2 is a decreasing function of A, and thus of QL' To summarise, as QL 
becomes more restrictive flrnl-2 lowers its quality and a slight increase in the qUality of flrnl-
1 is observed (figure~3). For a restriction imposed at a free tra~e level the domestic and 
foreign firm choose lower qualities, sJL·=0.2475602«sJ·) and Sll: =0.08902«S2·)' than 
under free trade. 
Both the high~quality domestic and low~quality foreign flrnl lower their qualities. 
Looking at figure-2 (by our quality indexing '2' is now the foreign firm and 'I' the 
domestic), the quantity restriction (QLQL) is now imposed at the free trade level (0.27460) 
on the vertical axis. Note, that the domestic firm, given the quota on the foreign flrnl, loses 
a smaller amount of market share under the restriction (figure-2), QHB, than it would under 
free trade, QHC, for the same decrease in its quality (that shifts Rt(X2) to R" t(X2»' Given, 
that the costs of quality are quadratic the incentive exists for the domestic firm to save on 
these costs by lowering its quality in the presence of the restraint. Meanwhile, the foreign 
firm also responds by lowering its quality (R" t (X2) shifts back). As it does not I,ose any 
market share and saves on the costs-of-quality. Thus, both fl1'ms optimally respond by 
lowering their qualities. The same argument applies for quotas close to the free trade level. 
Given, that for the quota at the free trade level SJL·/S21:( =2.78146) is less than S//S2· 
(=2.79243) the restriction will be binding on the foreign firm (R"t(X2) lies below Rt(X2»' 
It can be checked that the restriction is always binding on the foreign firm. To verify this, 
note that QL< (112) (0-xJL·) iff (4-1..) QL <0. Substituting QL from (17) it can be seen that the 
latter inequality is always true in the relevant range of A. 
< figure-3 here> 
Average quality (SAV) for a restriction at the free trade level is 0.187524. However, 
Figure-3 
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as the quota becomes restrictive average quality increases and is in-fact higher for a 
sufficiently restrictive quota than under free trade. By substituting for XIL*, x21.:, sJL* and 
'A.=s2L*lsJL*into SAY we get the expression, (114) (0-QL'A.) (0+QLAil(2QL+0-'A.QJ. Further 
substituting QL from (17) it is can be seen that dsAItD.. < 0; thus, dsAldQL < 0 in the relevant 
region. Finally, it can also be checked that sAv=0.1907 (average quality under free trade) 
for QL =0.24410. We summarize the results in proposition-2. 
PrQIJosition-2: For a level of restriction at, or close, to the free trade level both 
firms downgrade qualities. As the quota becomes more restrictive average quality in the 
market increases. Specifically, for a sufficiently restrictive quota, QL<0.24410, higher 
average quality (than underfree trade) is offered. However, for QL e (0.24410, O. 27460), the 
average quality offered is lower than under free trade. 
IV. Welfare Analysis. 
The welfare results are summarized in propositions 3 and 4, and are followed by a 
brief discussion. 
Proposition-3: Regardless of whether the foreign firm produces the low, or.the high, 
quality good: 
(i) Both firms always earn a higher level ofprofits for a restriction at, or close to, the 
free trade level than under free trade. The profits ofthe domestic firm increase as the quota 
becomes restrictive. Contrarily, the profits Of the foreign firm decrease. 
(ii) Consumer surplus is higher underfree trade thanfor a quota at the free trade level 
and decreases as the quota becomes more restrictive. 
Proposition-4: When the domesticfirm produces the low quality good the total welfare 
of the home country is always less than underfree trade. Contrarily, when the domestic firm 
produces the high quality good total welfare of the home country increases as the quota 
becomes restrictive. Total welfare is highest at the point where the foreign firm is shut out 
of the market and is also greater than under free trade. 
(i) Foreign firm high-quality: 
Both firms prefer a quota at the free trade level over no restrictions as their profits are 
higher when the restriction is imposed at the level of free trade. Their profits6 are 
6 1tlH*=(5QH-0)(0-QHlQHI8, 1t2H*=(0-QHlI32. As QH decreases, 1tIH*decreases and 
1t2H 
* . lIlcreases. 
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1C1H·=0.021304 (>1C/=0.0194604) and 1Cm·=0.OO28404 (>1C2·=0.OO273404). The low 
quality domestic firm always prefers a higher level of restriction on the foreign fmn as its 
profits increase as the quota becomes restrictive. As the profits of the foreign firm are 
highest for a VER at the level of free trade the foreign country would opt for such aVER. 
The total welfare7 of the home country is higher under free trade than under any level of 
quota in the relevant region. A quota at the level of free trade results in higher prices, lower 
total output, lower average quality and thus a decrease in the consumer surplus. This 
decrease in the consumer surplus outweighs the increase in the home firm's profits. For 
more restrictive quotas the rate of increase of home firm's profits is of a similar magnitude 
as the rate of decrease of the consumer surplus. Thus, the home government prefers a quota 
at the free trade level. 8 
(ii) Foreign firm low-quality. 
Both the firms prefer a quota at the free trade level as they make a higher level of 
profits than under free trade. Their profits9 are 1CIL·=0.0196304 (>1C/=0.0194604) and 
1C2H·=O.00275404 (>1C2·=0.OO273404). Once more, as the profits of the foreign ~1I1ll are 
highest for a VER at the level of free trade the foreign country would opt for such aVER. 
7 A word of caution is needed here. Our definition of TW gives equal weight to the 
producer profits and the consumer surplus. It is not clear if the home 'country' welfare is 
maximised and thus this point is preferred by everyone in the home country to the one over 
free trade. This is a very restrictive view of a ' measure' of welfare and should be taken 
with a pinch of salt. 
6 We can write consumer surplus (CS) as; CS=(lI2)f"QHJ I/9-QHJ(0 sm· -Pm·)d0+/9-
QHJe(E> SlH· -PlH·)d0 =(0-QH)(03+02 QH-5 0 QH2+ 19 QH )/32. Defining total welfare (TWH) as the CS+1C2H we get,TW= (0-QH) (03_02Q~ 0 QH2+ 9 QH3 )/16. Thus, consumer 
surplus is decreasing as Qh decreases. The first derivative of TW is positive if QH> 0.3745 
0, otherwise it is negative. Total welfare is maximised at a retriction level of (0.4508 0). 
9 1CIL·=(0-QL 'A,i(02-20QL'A.-3Q/'A.2)/32, 1C2L·='A.QL(02-Ql'A.2)(0-2QJ/16. As 'A. 
decreases (QL decreases) 1CIL• increases and 1C2L. decreases. 
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The domestic frrm prefers a higher level of restriction on the foreign frrm as its profit 
increases and acheive its maximum when the foreign frrm is competely shut out of the 
market. At this point the total welfare of the home country is higher (fWL=0.0625 
0 4 >TW* =0.05964304) than under free trade. Thus, the home country prefers to completely 
shut out imports of the low quality good. From the viewpoint of the consumer prices go up 
and total output sold decreases as the quota becomes more restrictive. As is stated in 
Proposition-2 average quality increases for a level of restriction less than 0.24410 and 
decreases for levels of restrictions between (0.2441 0, 0.27460). Note, that despite the 
increase in average quality «0.24410) consumer surplus decreases for all levels of the 
restriction. 10 
VI. Conclusion. 
This paper adds to the existing literature on imperfect competition (DD (1989), Ries 
(1993» in that it treats the choice of quality as a long run strategic variable. Due to this a 
firm can pre-commit to a level of quality before it competes in the market (as it incurs a sunk 
cost of improving its quality). We show that in a vertically differentiated model with quantity 
restrictions a firms' choice of quality not only depends on whether the restricted firm 
produces the low, or high, quality good but also on the restrictiveness of the quota. Contrary 
to the existing results we show that both firms downgrade their qualities for a restriction at, 
or close, to the free trade level. Only for the case where a very restrictive quota is imposed 
on the low quality foreign firm does average quality decrease. Further, we get quality 
downgrading even under the condition for which the foreign monopolist in Krishna (1987) 
1: The consumer surplus; eSL= (1121 (El _ aL (2 _ Alj(1121 (El - aL .AI (0 S2L-PuJ· d0 + (1121 (El + aL 
;)°(0 SlCPIJ d0 = (1132) (EY-efL j.}) (EY+2 J.. 0 QL +4 J..Q/- 3 J..2Q/). The consumer 
surplus decreases as QL decreases. Total welfare, TWL=(1116) ((02-efL J..2) (0-2J..0 QL+2 
J.. Q/), and is highest at QL=0. 
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upgrades its quality, Le., if Pxq < 0 (x is the good and q is the quality). Our results not only 
highlight the importance of quality choice under stragtegic interaction but, also the role of the 
timing of the decisions. 
In our framework fIrms compete frrst in qualities and then in quantities. For a quota 
imposed on the foreign fIrm at, or close to, the free trade level, the home frrm is able to 
decrease its quality and thus is able to save on the sunk costs of quality, while barely losing 
any market share. Similarly, the foreign flml also lowers its quality, maintaining its market 
share, and increases its profIt by (also) saving on the costs of quality. 
That quantity restrictions work as facilitating practices (as in Harris (1985), Krishna 
(1989» is funher reinforced in our framework. After the imposition of the restriction at the 
free trade level both firms lower qualities, raise prices and attain a higher level of profIts. 
Our analogue of the result is even more striking because quotas work as a facilitating practice 
device for the case of competition in quantities. This is contrary to the well known result that 
quotas have no influence on market outcomes when firms compete in quantities. It will be 
worthwhile to further study if the role of quotas as facilitating practice devices in our 
framework is even stronger when the firms compete in prices. 
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Appenidx-I: (The solutions in this part were obtained by using Mathematica) 
We check for leapfrogging in the following four cases. (la) and (lb) check for incentives to 
leapfrog in the case-l (domestic fmn low quality and foreign firm high quality) of the main 
text, and (2a) and (2b) (domestic fmn high quality and foreign fmn low quality) in the case-2. 
We present case (la) in detail. Similar steps are used for the other cases, and thus are 
explained briefly. 
(la) loW-Quality domestic firm leemfrogs the high-Q,Uality restricted forehm firm. 
The low-quality domestic firm, which leapfrogs and then produces the high quality, is denoted 
as firm-!. Thus, SI> SlH•= QH(0-QH) ' SlH· being the quality choice of the foreign fmn 
(equation (9». The ex-ante (before leapfrogging) profits of the domestic firm are, 1t2H•=(0-
QH )4/32. We need to compare these against the profits after leapfrogging when; 
(i-a) Foreign firm is restricted (R) ex-post, 1tl= SI (0 - QH SlH·/SI)2/4 - s/12. 
(i-b) Foreign firm is non-restricted (U) ex-post, 1tl= 0 2 [1 -2 s/(4 SI-SlH·)jl- s/12. 
To check under what conditions the foreign firm is restricted ex-post, we first define the 
quality level, S/(QH)' of the domestic firm which makes the quota just binding on the foreign 
firm. To do this, equate QH to (0-xlH)12 in (I-a) and take into account (I-b). 
(I-a) xlH=min [QH' (0-XI)/2], and (I-b) xl =[0-(SlH·IsI) XIH)· 
We thus get S/(QH) =[Qi(0-QH)/(4Q~0)]. Note, that the foreign firm is ex-post restricted 
for all SI SS/. Then S/(QH) <SIH·=QH(0-QH) for all QH> 013. Given that SI > SIH-' the 
foreign firm is ex-post non-restricted for quotas larger than 013. Now, to find the lower 
value of the quota for which the foreign firm is ex-post non-restricted, QH" we first evaluate 
the derivative of (i-b), d1tIUldsl at S/. Then, by equating the result to 0 and solving for QH' 
we get Q/ =0.3161790. 
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We check first for leapfrogging in the range of quotas where the foreign f1I1ll is ex-
post non-restricted, Le., for QHE[0.3161790, 0.45080). Numerically, the difference of (1CIU-
1C2H" ) was plotted and found to be < 0 for all SI and QH. Thus leapfrogging will not occur 
in this region. Next, we check for leapfrogging in the range of quotas where the foreign fIrm 
is restricted ex-post (i-a), Le. for the interval QHE (0.20. Ql). (Note, 0.20 is the quota for 
which the profIts of the foreign firm become zero). By plotting the difference of (1C/-1Cm") 
in the relevant range, we obesrve that it is positive for small enough values of QH. Then 
solving the system of equations {1C/-1Cm"=O, d1C//dsl =O} for (QH' SI) we obtain the lower 
bound for QH for which the domestic f1I1ll has no incentive to leapfrog. This is 
QH+ =0.2522350. (Note, that the corresponding optimal quality SI" =o.2401920 is higher than 
slH·=0.188610). Thus, if the quantity restrictions are in the range [0.2 0, 0.2522350) the 
domestic firm will leapfrog the foreign fIrm and produce a higher quality than S lH". 
Ob) HilZh-guality restricted foreign fIrm leapfrogs the IOW-Quality domestic fIrm. 
Denote the foreign firm that leapfrogs and produces the low quality as f1I1ll-2. Thus it 
produces a quality S2< S2H" =(114) (0-QH)2. Its ex-ante profIts are given by 1ClH" =[(5QJ{"'0) (0-
QHf QH/8]. We then compare these against the profits after leapfrogging when; 
(ii-a) Foreign fIrm restricted (R) ex-post, 1Cl=(S2 QH/2) (0-QH [2-(S/S2H"))}-s//2. 
U(ii-b) Foreign firm non-restricted (U) ex-post, 1C2 = [0 sm"/(4 sm"-s,)j2-s//2. 
Defining, S/(QH) as the quality level of the foreign fIrm which makes the quota just binding 
on itself. This is obtained from the following conditions; 
(II-a) [(0 /2) - (s/2 S2H") X2], and (II-b) x2=min[QH' (112) (0-xm))x2H = 
This gives us the expression for S/(QH) =S2H" [4-(0/QH)). Note, that the foreign f1I1ll is ex-
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post restricted for all S2> 5/(QH)' Thus if S/(QH)~ S2H· then the foreign ftnn is not restricted 
ex-post. This is true for all QH>0/3. Note, that 1t2U attains its maximum at the point 
S2·=S2H·' Thus the lower value of the quota for which the foreign ftnn is restricted is in fact 
Q/=0/3. 
Thus, checking for leapfrogging when the foreign ftnn is ex-post non-restricted (ii-b) 
we ftnd that 1t2U < 1tlH• for all QHe10/3, 0.45080] and for all S2H·~2' Now, for QH <0/3 (ii-a) 
is the relevant expression (the foreign ftrm is restricted ex-post). As before, solving the 
system of equations {1t/-1tlH·=O, d1t//ds2=O} we get the solutions QH++=0.236592 0 and 
52 =0.101201 0 2• This implies that if the foreign ftnn is of high quality no leapfrogging is 
observed in the range of quantity restrictions QH> 0.2522350. 
To conclude, if the foreign ftrm is of high quality then no ftnn has incentive to 
leapfrog if QH>maxIQH+' QH++] (Note, QH+ is obtained from Case-la.). Thus, for all 
QH'?0.2522350, (SlH·,S2H·) is an equilibrium. 
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(2a) Low Quality restricted foreign firm leapfrogs the high-Quality domestic firm. 
Denote the low-quality foreign firm that leapfrogs as f1I1Il-l. Then Sl >SlLo =(1I4)[02-QL2').}J, 
where QdA) =0[-1 + (1-4'A.+4').}+'A!i12]1()..3+4'A.-4). The ex-ante profits for the foreign flllll  
are 1t2L:='A.QL(02-Q/'A.2) (0-2QJ/16J. We compare the ex-ante profits against; 
(iii-a) Foreign firm restricted (R) ex-post, 1tl= (Q/2) (0-QJ (2 Sl-SlL·) - s/12. 
(Hi-b) Foreign firm non-restricted (U) ex-post, 1tlU= 0 s11-2 s/(4 SrSJLO)J-s/12. 
Asking the question; Under what QL' is (iii-b) the relevant expression and solving for s/(QJ 
from the following expressions; 
(Ill-a) XlL =(112) (0-xl) and (Ill-b) xl=min[Qv (0/2) - (SlLo/2 Sl) xlJ.  
We obtain s/(QJ =SlLO(0-QJI2(0-2QJ. Now, if the max s/(QJ <min. SlLO(QJ, then (iii-a) 
is the 'only relevant expression (foreign firm is restricted ex-post). We get, min 
slLo=0.2475602 and the max.s/(QJ={max.slLO}[max.(l12)(0-QJ(0-2QJJ= 
(114)(0.80457)=0.2011402• Thus, max s/(QJ (=0.2011402) <min SlLo (=0.2475602). 
Thus, the foreign firm is always restricted ex-post. Further, the restricted profit (1tl) < the 
ex-ante profits (7t21.,") for all (Qv Sl)' Thus, there does not exist any incentive to leapfrog in 
this case. 
(2b) High-guality domestic firm leapfrogs the IOW-Quality restricted foreign firm. 
Denoting the high quality domestic firm that leapfrogs as firm-2. Then, S2 <S2L· =()..I4)[02-
Q/'A.2J= QL(0/2)-QJ +'A.Q/ Given, theex-anteprofits1tlL °= (0-'A.QJ2(02-20QL'A.-3Q/'A.2)132, 
where, QL()..) =0[-1+ (1-4'A.+4'A.2+'A.4i 12]1()..3+4 'A.-4). We compare this against; 
(iv-a) Foreign firm restricted (R) ex-post, 1tl= (114) (0-QJ2 S2- s/12. 
(iv-b) Foreign firm non-restricted (U) ex-post, 1t2u=[0 S2LoI (4 s2Lo-szjl s2-s/12. 
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Once more, asking the question; Under what QL' is (iv-b) the relevant expression and 
obtaining s/(QJ from the following; 
(IV-a) x2 = (0/2)-(x2L/2) and (IV-b) x2L=minlQu (0/2)- (s/2 S2L·)x2.]. 
Which gives us s/(QJ=2s2L·(0-2QJ/(0-QJ. Note, that xl attains its maximium at S2=S2L· 
Note, that s/(QJ/S2L·> 1 for all QLeIO, 0.27460J (in fact for all QL <0/3). Hence, the only 
relevant region is (iv-a). However, the Max[xl-xlL·J<O for all values of QL' Thus, the no-
leapfrogging condition is always satisfied if the foreign firm is of low quality. 
In conclusion, when the domestic firm is of high quality no firm has an incentive to 
leapfrog its rival. Thus, (SlL·' S2L) is an equilibrium for all QL' 
